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## Viewing cable 06BEIRUT2540, TFLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">06BEIRUT2540</a>	<a href="#">2006-08-06 07:27</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Beirut</a>

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 002540

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016  
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SUBJECT: TFLE01: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION

¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: On August 4 A/S Welch, Ambassador, and PolOff attended a dinner hosted by Marwan Hamade, Minister of Telecommunications, and attended by Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze community and the Progressive Socialist Party. Jumblatt warned that what he described as Israel's ineffective ground operations and intelligence is a danger for Israel and the region. Hamade and Jumblatt expressed hesitancy about a two-resolution UNSCR approach to end the fighting. They believe that Hizballah will fire upon the Israeli army if it remains in southern Lebanon, even if a cease-fire is agreed upon. They think it is useful to increase pressure on the south to coax Speaker Berri and Hizballah into a cease-fire. Finally they believe that for Lebanon to become stronger, the ties between Iran and Syria must be weakened. END SUMMARY

Culture of Death  
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¶2. (C/NF) Jumblatt expressed regret that, in his view, Israel failed to assess Hizballah's operations on the ground. He questioned how Israel was completely taken by surprise on July 12. He concluded that today the tables have turned to Hizballah's advantage as the organization is founded on a "culture of death." Hizballah fighters want to die as martyrs and will not hesitate to blow themselves up to kill Israelis. In addition, there is a new generation of Israeli soldiers that are not as driven and motivated as their predecessors. He thinks this was illustrated in the past weeks of fighting and warns that it is dangerous for Israel and the region for this to be revealed.

Cease Fire Not  
At Any Price  
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¶3. (C/NF) Hamade expressed concern over the two resolutions for a cease-fire that will be proposed by the UN instead of one proposal that addresses all concerns at one time. A/S Welch explained that this was a compromise between the U.S. and the French. After extensive consultations with the Israelis, the U.S. believed that a cease-fire is not possible without a new capable stabilization force, while the French argued that a stabilization force is not possible without the cease-fire. The two-resolution solution ends the violence, which is important for Lebanon and the Lebanese people. Jumblatt exclaimed that Lebanon wants a cease-fire, but not one at just any price.

¶4. (C/NF) Ambassador noted that PM Siniora had argued for a one-phase plan, saying that there must be momentum. Siniora had suggested that the LAF immediately deploy upon a cease-fire. Jumblatt and Hamade both agreed that Siniora's approach would not work. In their view, the army is not entirely reliable, and Hizballah will remain armed and dangerous in the south if there is no international force.

¶5. (C/NF) But Hamade and Jumblatt were also skeptical about the two-phase sequencing. If the IDF stays in place temporarily, Hizballah will fire upon the Israelis -- even if a cease-fire is agreed upon in a first resolution. That would essentially scuttle the possibility for implementation of a second resolution, as no international force will come to Lebanon while Hizballah is firing on Israeli Army. Just as Hizballah, Syria, and Iran want, the fighting will continue. Jumblatt added that one way to remedy this is for the Israeli army to partake in a focused ground incursion that will be more likely to destroy or seriously Hizballah. But, he shrugged, Israel has already shown that it will not do this.

¶6. (C/NF) A/S Welch advised that another way to avoid this outcome is to gain rapid UN passage of the resolution and for GOL to quickly accept. The burden will then be on Israel to do the same and it is up to the international community to provide the troops for the stabilization force.

Pressure to Influence  
Outcome  
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¶17. (C/NF) When asked if the GOL will agree to the resolution Hamade stated the majority of the government could but Hizballah would have to ask Iran. Jumblatt added that Nasrallah will not make the decision to support the resolution alone. A Shia catalyst will have to pressure

BEIRUT 00002540 002 OF 002

Nasrallah.

¶18. (C/NF) Hamade nominated House Speaker Nabih Berri to be the catalyst, though warning that this strategy may not work because of the influence of Syria and Iran. Nonetheless, Berri can play the role of a mediator because of his role in the Lebanese state. Yet to coax Berri, and ultimately Nasrallah, more destruction and occupation of the Shia south might be needed, until a Shia leader was ready to say "enough fighting." Hamade suggested that the occupation of villages would be blow to Hizballah because before the conflict all villages were liberated.

¶19. (C/NF) Both Berri and the Shia constituents themselves must be convinced to "hold on to what is left" and choose between having a state or endless war. Berri already sees that everything that he has built in the south is destroyed, added Jumblatt. Hamade agreed with the assessment and added that the Shia are weak. All of the Shia from the south, except for two villages, have been displaced. There are weekly disputes between supporters of Amal and Hizballah in areas where they are displaced. The pressure on the Shia should continue. Then offer a cease-fire, reconstruction money and the possibility of Shebaa.

¶10. (C/NF) Jumblatt and Hamede suggested that A/S Welch approach Berri with the prestige of being the main Shia leader in the state apparatus. Be honest with him about the two-phase resolution, they counseled; indicate to him that the international community is not asking GOL and GOI to support the resolution but to accept it as soon as it is passed.

Marginalize Syria  
and Iran  
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¶11. (C/NF) Asked about his advice to move the resolutions forward, Jumblatt advised to "keep the Syrians out." Yet he admitted not knowing how to do so. Hamade warned that Syria will try to return to Lebanon. In his view, it is essential to close and protect the routes to Syria.

¶12. (C/NF) A/S Welch stressed that the overall objective must be to strengthen Lebanon. Jumblatt responded that Syria must be weakened for Lebanon to be strengthened. He praised the Egyptian and Saudi positions to break the ties between Syria and Iran. He recommended that a civilian line be created to transport Lebanese in and out of Lebanon because lines to Syria should be closed. He added that Syria will lose face if Lebanese territory is occupied and Shebaa Farms is not liberated. The Shia will question why Syria did not help Hizballah.

¶13. (U) Assistant Secretary Welch has cleared this cable.  
FELTMAN